Secured Information Flow for Asynchronous Sequential Processes by Attali, Isabelle et al.
HAL Id: inria-00122937
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00122937
Submitted on 5 Jan 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Secured Information Flow for Asynchronous Sequential
Processes
Isabelle Attali, Denis Caromel, Ludovic Henrio, Felipe Luna
To cite this version:
Isabelle Attali, Denis Caromel, Ludovic Henrio, Felipe Luna. Secured Information Flow for Asyn-
chronous Sequential Processes. 3rd International Workshop on Security Issues in Concurrency
(SecCo’05), Aug 2005, San Francisco, USA. ￿inria-00122937￿
WLFM 2005 Preliminary Version
Secured Information Flow for Asynchronous
Sequential Processes
Isabelle Attali, Denis Caromel, Ludovic Henrio1,
Felipe Luna Del Aguila
INRIA Sophia Antipolis, CNRS - I3S - Univ. Nice Sophia Antipolis
2004, Route des Lucioles, BP 93 - F-06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France
{ia, caromel, henrio, fluna}@sophia.inria.fr
Abstract
We present in this article a precise security model for data confidentiality in the frame-
work of ASP (Asynchronous Sequential Processes). ASP is based on active objects, asyn-
chronous communications, and data-flow synchronizations. We extend it with security
levels attached to activities (active objects) and transmitted data.
We design a security model that guarantees data confidentiality within an application;
this security model takes advantages of both mandatory and discretionary access models.
We extend the semantics of ASP with predicate conditions that provide a formal security
framework, dynamically checking for unauthorized information flows. As a final result, all
authorized communication paths are secure: no disclosure of information can happen. This
theoretically-founded contribution may have a strong impact on distributed object-based
applications, that are more and more present and confidentiality-demanding on the Internet,
it also arises a new issue in data confidentiality: authorization of secured information flow
transiting (by the mean of futures) through an unsecured component.
Key words: Access control, distribution, objects, futures.
1 Introduction
The main contribution of this work is to provide data confidentiality and secure
information flows for asynchronous distributed object-based applications. The pro-
posed security model heavily relies on security policy rules with mandatory en-
forcements for the control of information flow. While information flows are gen-
erally verified statically [20,3,15,14,25,22,16,10], our attention is focused on dy-
namic verifications. To achieve it, our model has an information control policy that
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includes discretionary rules, and because these rules are by nature dynamically en-
forceable, we can take advantage of the dynamic checks to carry out at the same
time all mandatory checks. As another advantage of this approach, dynamic checks
do not require to modify compilers, do not alter the programming languages, do not
require modifications to existing source codes, and provide flexibility at run-time.
Thus, dynamic checks fit well in a middleware layer which, in a non-intrusive man-
ner, provides and ensures security services to upper-level applications.
Our underlying programming model [8] is based on active objects, asynchronous
communications, and data-flow synchronizations. On the security side, security
levels are used to independently tag the entities involved in the communication
events: active objects and transmitted data. These “independent” tagging is how-
ever subject to discretionary rules. The combination of mandatory and discre-
tionary rules allows to relax the strict controls imposed by the mandatory rules.
Overview
As activities do not share memory, our security mechanism associates a security
level to each activity (an activity is a set of objects manipulated by a single thread).
Additionally, a level can be associated to data transmitted between activities (re-
quest parameters and created activities). Our mechanism is based on the strict no-
tions of “no write-down” and “no read-up” taken from the model of Bell-LaPadula
[4], but discretionary rules allow to associate specific level to communicated data;
thus avoiding restrictiveness of the above notions. Dynamic checks are performed
at activity creation, request and reply communications. The advantages of this ap-
proach are twofold:
a sound foundation. This security model is founded on a strong theoretical back-
ground, the ASP calculus [7,6], related to well-known formalisms [14,13,10,9].
We extend the formal semantics of ASP with predicate conditions. This pro-
vides a formal basis to our model, and makes it possible to dynamically check
for unauthorized accesses. Finally, in order to prove the correctness of our secu-
rity model, an intuitive secure information flow property is defined and proved
to be ensured by the application of access control model.
scalability and flexibility. We also target practical use of this model, with an im-
plementation into middlewares, e.g. ProActive [21]. The granularity of our se-
curity model is defined in order to make it both efficient (because there is no
security check inside an activity) and finely tunable: levels can be defined on
activities but a specific level can be given to communicated data.
The impact of this work lies on the recent changes of paradigms in the area of
distributed computing. The service oriented nature of ASP makes communications
asymmetric (request and replies) and asynchronous. This security framework is, to
our knowledge, the first to be adapted to the specificities of these communications.
One of the main novel issues revealed by this work is the case of the first class
futures (futures are promises of reply), and the fact that some secured informa-
tion flows, impossible in other security frameworks, can be envisioned for secured
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asynchronous services.
Section 2 recalls our base model for objects and communications. Section 3.1
presents an access control model that can has been implemented for ASP. Section
3.2 defines and verifies an intuitive secure information flow property: an informa-
tion flow is secure if all activity creations, requests and replies transmissions are se-
cure. Section 3.3 analyzes the specificity of our security model for service-oriented
computing. Next, relation to existing work is discussed in section 4. An appendix
gives an example showing the kind of security policy we are able to ensure, and the
specificity of our model.
2 A Model for Objects and Communications
distributed over (single threaded) activities, without shared memory. Activities
communicate by asynchronous method calls, and reply by means of futures, thus
leading to a data-flow synchronization. Futures allow latency hiding without loos-
ing, neither ease of programming nor efficiency. This paper will soundly formalize
the security of information flow for this recent programming methodology: asyn-
chronous service-oriented programming.
2.1 Distributed Object Model
The ASP calculus is an extension of the impς-calculus [1] where asynchronous
communicating processes prevail. These processes, or activities, are running in
parallel, but with their internal operations executed sequentially. What makes it
outstanding are the concepts of active objects, wait-by-necessity, and futures. An
active object is a “classical” object which is to be run remotely, in an activity, with
its own sequential thread of execution. Table 1 presents the syntax of the ASP
language. The classical sequential reduction rules for the semantics description
can be found in [7].
a, b ∈ L’ ::= x variable,
| [li = bi; mj = ς(xj, yj)aj]
i∈1..n
j∈1..m object,
| a.li field access,
| a.li := b field update,
| a.mj(b) method call,
| clone(a) superficial copy,
| Active(a,mj) object activation,
| Serve(m1, ..,mn)
n>0 service primitive,
| ι location (not in source).
| a ⇑ f, b a with continuation b
Table 1
The ASP calculus syntax
It is important to note that an activity is composed of only one active object,
many passive (i.e., classical) objects and also many references to other active ob-
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jects. As an example, Figure 1 shows activities α and β, where activity α has
(among other entities) its own active object, two passive objects and a reference to
activity β. Additionally, there is no shared memory: passive objects can only be
referenced by objects belonging to the same activity, but any object can reference
an active one.
One of the main contribution of ASP is the formalization of futures and request-
reply patterns of communication. Futures are generalized references representing
promises of reply that can be manipulated as a classical object (i.e. copied and
transmitted inside and between activities) while their real value is not needed. An
operation that needs the value of the object (e.g. a field access) is blocked until the
necessary reply occurs. This automatic and transparent synchronization mechanism
is called wait-by-necessity.
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Fig. 1. Example of a parallel configuration
Recalling the ASP syntax and semantics, a parallel configuration is a set of
activities (α, β, γ ∈ Act) of the form: P, Q ::= α[a; σ; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ β[· · · ] ‖ · · ·
where a is the current term to be reduced; σ is the store containing all objects
belonging to activity α; ι is the active object location; F is the list associating each
result of a served request to its futures; R is the list of pending requests; and f is the
future of the current term. Additional semantic notations are: locations ι and future
identifiers fi are local to an activity; a future f
α→β
i is defined by an identifier fi, a
source activity α and a destination activity β according to the request; a reference
to the active object of activity α is denoted by AO(α); and a reference to a future
is denoted by fut(fα→βi ).
Informally, ASP semantics consists in partitioning objects into distinct activi-
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ties manipulated by a single thread (no memory is shared). Those activities com-
municate by asynchronous request-response mechanism: When an object perform
a method call an an active object (i.e., remote object), a request is enqueued on the
callee side and the caller receives a future (an empty object that will be filled with
the result of the request).
(a, σ) →S (a
′, σ′) →S does not clone a future
α[a; σ; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ P −→ α[a′; σ′; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ P
(LOCAL)
γ fresh activity ι′ 6∈ dom(σ)
σ′ = {ι′ 7→ AO(γ)} :: σ σγ = copy(ι
′′, σ)
α[R[Active(ι′′, mj)]; σ; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ P −→
α[R[ι′]; σ′; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ γ[ι′′.mj(); σγ ; ι
′′; ∅; ∅; ∅] ‖ P
(NEWACT)
σα(ι) = AO(β) ι
′′ 6∈ dom(σβ) f
α→β
i new future
ιf 6∈ dom(σα) σ
′
β = Copy&Merge(σα, ι
′ ; σβ, ι
′′)
σ′α = {ιf 7→ fut(f
α→β
i )} :: σα
α[R[ι.mj(ι
′)]; σα; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ; σβ; ιβ; Fβ ; Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
α[R[ιf ]; σ
′
α; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ; σ
′
β; ιβ; Fβ ; Rβ :: [mj ; ι
′′; fα→βi ]; fβ ] ‖ P
(REQUEST)
R = R′ :: [mj ; ιr; f
′] :: R′′ mj ∈ M ∀m ∈ M, m /∈ R
′
α[R[Serve(M)]; σ; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ P −→
α[ι.mj(ιr) ⇑ f,R[[]]; σ; ι; F ; R
′ :: R′′; f ′] ‖ P
(SERVE)
ι′ 6∈ dom(σ) F ′ = F :: {f 7→ ι′}
σ′ = Copy&Merge(σ, ι ; σ, ι′)
α[ι ⇑ f ′, a; σ; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ P −→ α[a; σ′; ι; F ′; R; f ′] ‖ P
(ENDSERVICE)
σα(ι) = fut(f
γ→β
i ) Fβ(f
γ→β
i ) = ιf
σ′α = Copy&Merge(σβ , ιf ; σα, ι)
α[aα; σα; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ; σβ ; ιβ; Fβ ; Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
α[aα; σ
′
α; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β[aβ; σβ; ιβ ; Fβ ; Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P
(REPLY)
Table 2
Parallel reduction
2.2 Communication Model
The ASP communication model is based on the parallel reduction rules shown in
Table 2. These rules are based on a copy(ι, σ) operator which performs a deep copy
of the store σ starting at location ι and Copy&Merge(σβ, ι′ ; σα, ι) which appends,
at the location ι of the store σα, a deep copy of the store σβ starting at location ι′.
From these reduction rules, only the communication rules (NEWACT, REQUEST
and REPLY) are involved in the security framework. The NEWACT reduction rule
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creates a new activity γ containing the deep copy of an object. A generalized ref-
erence to this activity AO(γ) is stored in the source activity α. In the REQUEST
reduction rule, activity α sends a new request to activity β. The new request
[mj; ι
′′; fα→βi ] is made up of the target method mj , the location ι
′′ of the argument
passed in the request message, and the future identifier fα→βi which will be related
to the response resulting from the request. Note that in location ι′′ there is a deep
copy of the argument passed to the target method. The REPLY reduction rule, takes
a reference to a future and updates it with its value. The reference to the future
must exist in one activity α and the corresponding value must have been calculated
in another activity β. Note that a future f γ→βi can be updated in an activity different
from the origin of the request (γ 6= α).
3 The Security Model
In this section, we define a security model that guarantees the classic property of
data confidentiality for multi-level security systems: a specific user with the ap-
propriate clearance will be given access only to the information that he/she is al-
lowed to handle. This notion of data confidentiality must not be confused with the
confidentiality provided by encryption mechanisms (i.e. information obscuring).
The security terminology uses the subjects-objects relationship [24], and because
the word “object” can be confusing here, we refer to this relationship as “subject-
target”.
We first recall usual notions of access control models and define our model in
terms of entities and secured communications; which means that we formally ex-
tend ASP into Secure ASP. Then, we present our notion of secure information flow
between activities with an important property for data confidentiality. We finally
point out a fundamental aspect of the expressiveness of our model for service-
oriented computing.
3.1 Access Control Model
Access control models are generally classified into mandatory (MAC) or discre-
tionary (DAC) models. The MAC model can be best described through the Multi-
Level Security (MLS) model which is based on a lattice of security levels assigned
to subjects and targets. Once levels are assigned, neither “normal users” nor pro-
cesses can change them; making the system more secure against unauthorized ac-
cess to the information. The MLS model is suited to address the confidentiality
issue in information flows, but its inconvenience is that in certain cases it is less
than adequate for practical systems. DAC models are based on an access control
matrix relating rights on subjects over targets, where the rights may be assigned
at the “discretion” of the “normal users” or their processes; this simple form of
operation makes it more flexible compared to MLS.
The solution we propose is based on the concepts of MLS, with analogous no-
tions of “no write-down” and “no read-up” taken from the model of Bell-LaPadula [4],
6
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but it is generalized here by introducing exceptions according to discretionary rules.
We begin by describing all entities involved in our security framework:
• S is the set of activities acting as subjects and/or targets: α, β, γ, ... ∈ S;
• D is the set of objects sent in the arguments of REQUESTS; a REQUEST is now
written as Rqα→β(d) where d = σα(ι′) ∈ D,
• R is the set of objects associated to futures, and returned in REPLIES; a REPLY
is now written as Rpβ→α(r) where r = σβ(ιf ) ∈ R.
Let A be the set of actions involved in the security mechanisms, i.e., REQUEST,
REPLY and NEWACT. The following notations are added to ASP:
• Security levels λ are taken from a finite set L, partially ordered by the relation
≤, ∀i ∈ S ∪ D ∪R, λi ∈ L,
• T ⊆ S × S ×A represents the authorized actions (source, destination, action),
• the matrix M : S × S→P(A) gives explicit (discretionary) rights to assign a
level to a given data for a given action. For each subject-target pair, the matrix
contains a set of authorized actions involving the assignation of a security level.
P(A) classically denotes the set of sets of actions. The classic subject-target-
action matrix is extended to include (allowed) security levels. This matrix can
be implemented with a security policy file (e.g. XACML policy files [11]).
This results in the following characterization of actions:
• Nw(γ, λγ) is a modified activity creation rule (NEWACT) in order to assign a
security level λγ to a created activity γ,
• Rqα→β(d, λin) is a modified REQUEST transmission rule tagging the transmit-
ted data with a security level (the programmer gives a security level to data d),
• Rpβ→α(r) is a REPLY transmission rule unchanged from original ASP.
To summarize, a ∈ A if and only if a = Rqα→β(d, λin) ∨ a = Rpβ→α(r) ∨
a = Nw(γ, λγ). Moreover, to be precise, M only has values in REQUEST or
NEWACT. That is to say, it is not possible in our model to give to replies a discre-
tionary right.
The security levels of subjects, targets, data and responses reflect the form of
communications handled by activities. Figure 2 shows this form of communica-
tions. All activities are tagged with a security level and all objects and their meth-
ods therein contained will automatically inherit that level (a and b are objects, ms
is the calling method of the source activity, and mt is the target method). Every
data d used in a request transfer is also marked with a security level but this level is
independent from that of the source activity.
It is the programmer responsibility to assign the security level to data d. Conse-
quently, the level of the transmitted data will be added to the syntax of the method
call (see Table 3). Even if it is not detailed in the following, a default behavior
should consist in assigning the level of the sender activity to data d sent as request
parameter. In turn, every value r returned in a reply transfer will automatically be
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mt λindx=b. ( )
λind
processing
data
r λt
λαa
msλα
βλb
mt
βλ
λαα βλβ
(task)
targetsubject
Fig. 2. Communication between security-marked activities.
tagged with the security level of the target method (level inherited from the activ-
ity). This form of tagging allows output data to be independent of input data in the
processing method, in other words, the security level for the output data does not
depend on the level of the input data but on the processing of the data itself.
The conditions for secure communications in ASP are then derived and formal-
ized according to our policy for communications:
Definition 1 (Secure activity creation)
∀α, γ ∈ S, (α, γ,Nw(γ, λγ)) ∈ T ⇐⇒ (λα ≤ λγ) ∨ Nw(γ, λγ) ∈ M(α, γ)
An activity creation Nw(γ, λγ) is authorized if the activity is created with a level
greater or equal to the one of the source activity. Else, if α wants to downgrade the
data (i.e., the objects) used to create this new activity then there must be an explicit
right allowing such an operation.
Definition 2 (Secure request transmission)
∀α, β ∈ S, (α, β,Rqα→β(d, λin)) ∈ T ⇔ (λin ≤ λβ) ∧


((λα > λin) ∧ Rqα→β(d, λin) ∈ M(α, β))
∨ (λα ≤ λin)
∨ ∃γ, δ, fi, d = fut(f
γ→δ
i )


The request transmission Rqα→β(d, λin) is authorized if the security level λin of the
transmitted data d, is smaller or equal to the security level λβ of the target activity
β; or, when source activity α with level λα tries to assign a level λin to data d
(i.e. a data downgrading), there is an explicit right (discretionary rule M(α, β))
that grants it. The philosophy behind a secure request transmission is to “release”
information only to a target which holds the appropriate clearance.
We also have a safe request transmission if the security level of data λin is
greater or equal than that of the source λα. In that case, we have λα ≤ λin ≤ λβ ,
showing that activity α safely releases data d because d has a greater security level,
and at the same time, activity β receives a lower level data.
Moreover, a safe request transmission is also achieved when handling future
references fut(f γ→δi ) as data. Future references can be freely transmitted between
activities because they do not hold any valuable information. We recall that values
associated to futures hold information but future references only hold addresses or
directions pointing to futures. In this sense, if a future reference is known, it does
not mean we can directly get the future value, because anyway, the future value
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transmission will be performed by, and submitted to the security rules of, a secure
reply transmission.
Definition 3 (Secure reply transmission)
∀α, β ∈ S : (α, β,Rpβ→α(r)) ∈ T ⇐⇒ (λβ ≤ λα) ∨ (∃γ, δ, fi, r = fut(f
γ→δ
i ))
The secure reply transmission REPLY Rpβ→α(r) is authorized if the security level
λβ of target β is smaller or equal to the security level λα of subject α, or if the
transmitted result r only consists of a reference to a future f γ→δi .
Table 3 shows the differences between the secure ASP calculus and the original
one (Table 1): security information is added to the activation and method call terms.
a, b ∈ L′ ::= a.mj(b
λin) method call,
| Activeλa(a,mj) object activation,
| . . .
Table 3
Secure ASP calculus: modified primitives
After attaching a security level to each activity, parallel configurations are now
of the following form: P,Q ::= αλα [a; σ; ι; F ; R; f ]‖βλβ [· · · ]‖ · · ·
γ fresh activity ι′ 6∈ dom(σ) σ′ = {ι′ 7→ AO(γ)} :: σ
σγ = copy(ι
′′, σ) (α, γ, Nw(γ, λγ)) ∈ T
αλ[R[Activeλa(ι′′, mj)]; σ; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ P −→
αλ[R[ι′]; σ′; ι; F ; R; f ] ‖ γλa [ι′′.mj(); σγ ; ι
′′; ∅; ∅; ∅] ‖ P
(SecNEWACT)
σα(ι) = AO(β) ι
′′ 6∈ dom(σβ) f
α→β
i new future
ιf 6∈ dom(σα) σ
′
β = Copy&Merge(σα, ι
′ ; σβ, ι
′′)
σ′α = {ιf 7→ fut(f
α→β
i )} :: σα (α, β, Rqα→β(σα(ι
′), λin)) ∈ T
αλα [R[ι.mj(ι
′λin)]; σα; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ ; σβ; ιβ; Fβ ; Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
αλα [R[ιf ]; σ
′
α; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ; σ
′
β; ιβ ; Fβ ; Rβ :: [mj ; ι
′′; fα→βi ]; fβ] ‖ P!
(SecREQUEST)
σα(ι) = fut(f
γ→β
i ) Fβ(f
γ→β
i ) = ιf
σ′α = Copy&Merge(σβ , ιf ; σα, ι) (β, α, Rpβ→α(σβ(ιf ))) ∈ T
αλα [aα; σα; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ; σβ ; ιβ; Fβ ; Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P −→
αλα [aα; σ
′
α; ια; Fα; Rα; fα] ‖ β
λβ [aβ; σβ; ιβ ; Fβ ; Rβ ; fβ ] ‖ P
(SecREPLY)
Table 4
Secure parallel reduction rules
Finally, Table 4 presents the semantics of the secure parallel ASP calculus.
These semantics rules ensure secure information flow. They use the security in-
formation attached to the activation and method call terms (λa and λin in the
9
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Nw(γ, λa) and Rqα→β(d, λin) rules) to verify the secure transmission and activ-
ity creation defined before (Definitions1, 2 and 3). When a communication is
not authorized, from the formal point of view, it is simply blocked. In practice a
dedicated exception should be raised and appropriately handled.
3.2 Secure Information Flow in the Object Model
We formally define the notion of information flow between activities. The con-
sidered entities are activities together with their passive objects, and not passive
objects on their own. Because activities can be distributed, Non-Interference re-
lated notions [12] can not be directly applied to our model.
Next, system-wide information flows are described by a path. The path is the
route along which the information travels, it is constructed by a chain of communi-
cating activities where a subject activity is the starting-point and a target activity is
the end-point of the path. Each information transmission observed on each activity
will serve for the construction of a path. This path will be called flow-path.
Flow-paths fp are lists of activities (fp := α.β. · · · ). They consist of the or-
dered list of transiting activities for a given information flow. For example ϕ γ.δ(α, β)
means that some information has been transmitted from activity α to activity β
through activities γ and δ. Concatenation of flow-paths fp and fp ′ is denoted by
fp.fp′. By application of the security mechanisms to the non-secure information
flow and flow-paths, a first property results: previous definition of information flow
for an activity becomes secure if all activity creations, requests and replies trans-
missions are secure.
Definition 4 (Secure information flow) An elementary flow of information is ei-
ther based on the sending of a request, or on the sending of a reply, or on the
creation of an activity. A flow of information is sequentially composed of several
elementary flows. The flow-path of any flow of information is the concatenation of
intermediate activities, it allows us to retrieve the original elementary flows. Se-
cure information flow is built by concatenation of elementary secure information
flows which are secured communications: secure REQUEST, REPLY, or NEWACT.
Formally:
(α, β,Rqα→β(σ(ι
′), λin)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(α, β)
(β, α,Rpβ→α(σα(ιf ))) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(β, α)
(α, γ,Nw(γ, λγ)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(α, γ)
Secϕfp1(α, γ) Secϕfp2(γ, β)
Secϕfp1.γ.fp2(α, β)
The following property states that a flow of information is secured if and only
if it follows a secure path.
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Property (Secure path for information flow) A flow of information is secured
if and only if it is composed of elementary secure information flows.
Secϕγ1···γn(α, β) ⇐⇒ Secϕ∅(α, γ1) ∧ Secϕ∅(γ1, γ2) ∧ · · · ∧ Secϕ∅(γn, β)
The proof of this property is straightforward; it is obtained by induction on the
length of the information flow path and by a case analysis on the rules of Defini-
tion 4.
This property does not take advantage of the MAC aspect of our model. In-
deed, the same property could have been obtained with a purely DAC approach.
This property rather shows that our specific and somehow less restrictive definition
of information flow does not compromise secured information flow. A secured in-
formation flow property using the MAC aspect of our security policy is beyond the
scope of this study. More generally, the study of the relation between mandatory
and discretionary rules is closely related to the work of Bertino et al. [5].
Compared with other solutions, our secure information flow is the simple com-
position of a complex elementary flow. This results from the adaptation of the
security formalism to a specific service-oriented framework. Complexity of the el-
ementary flow comes from the asymmetric and asynchronous nature of ASP com-
munications. Once such basic secure communications are ensured, the security of
information flows is verified in a simple and intuitive manner. The soundness of
secure information flow is thus ensured by a precise definition of information in
the previous section and the fact that secure communications defined in Section3.1
ensure that every information flow must verify the security policy.
Also note that the way our discretionary rights matrix is built allows to envision
a precise tuning concerning the (dynamic) entities involved and the levels that can
be assigned to data when downgrading them.
3.3 Specificity of Service-Oriented Computing
Preceding sections showed how classical MAC and DAC security principles can be
adapted to ASP and extended, finally ensuring both flexibility and scalability.
Future references are first class objects and can be passed between activities
(feature known as automatic continuations), thus they have an important conse-
quence concerning the secured flows of information. Indeed, without automatic
continuations, a flow of replies would directly follow the opposite path that a flow
of requests. In other words, in a classical mandatory ruled system, a request-reply
pattern of communications can only occur between entities that have the same se-
curity level.
A first contribution of this paper is to authorize discretionary exceptions to these
rules concerning level of data transmitted by requests. This allows some request-
reply pattern to occur when the request sends non confidential data.
The possibility to transmit future references leads to a model well adapted spe-
cific to service-oriented computing. Let us focus on the configuration of Figure3.
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Req γ Active Object
f’2
Active ObjectReq δ
f2
Active Object
β
f1
AO(  )δ
γ
δ
AO(  )γ
Fig. 3. A classical example: delegation
This configuration can be obtained by a classical scenario: β makes a request to
γ (future f2); but β is only an intermediate and delegates to δ the responsibility to
calculate the final result (future f′
2
). Let us suppose that λδ ≤ λβ < λγ , that is
to say the intermediate activity γ has a (too) high security level (this may be the
reason why the request has been delegated).
If one did not have automatic continuation, γ could not return the value of future
f2 because it is a future reference to f ′2. Anyway, δ can reply to γ (because λδ < λγ)
but γ cannot forward this result value to β because λβ < λγ . Indeed, the derivation
transmitting the result from δ to β cannot be derived by the preceding rules (not
authorized means reduction rule cannot be applied):
λδ < λγ
(δ, γ, Rpδ→γ(result)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(δ, γ)
not authorized
(γ, β, Rpγ→β(r
′)) /∈ T
Secϕ∅(γ, β)
Secϕγ(δ, β)
One could expect a better behavior because the direct reply from δ to β should
be authorized according to the security model: δ cannot reply only because there
is an intermediate activity γ. Indeed if the request had not transited by γ the
reply would be authorized. This is why the secured communication rules state
that,futures can be freely transmitted (remember a future does not hold valuable
information); consequently γ can reply to β if the response is restricted to a future
reference. Afterward, δ can reply directly to β because λδ ≤ λβ , and β obtains the
real value associated to f2.
r = f ′γ→δ
2
(γ, β, Rpγ→β(r)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(γ, β)
λδ ≤ λβ
(δ, β, Rpδ→β(r)) ∈ T
Secϕ∅(δ, β)
This example justifies the possibility to freely transmit future references and
demonstrates a communication pattern that would not be possible without the ex-
pressiveness of futures and the specific secured rules that exist in our mechanism.
Whereas, in ASP, the order in which future update occur has no consequence on
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the execution of a program, this example shows that in Secure ASP it is important
to adopt a convenient future update strategy.
4 Related Work
Henessy and Riely present an extension of π-calculus [18,19], a calculus aimed
at distributed systems, extended through the use of (security) types [14]. We do
not employ explicit channels to communicate but the read and write actions are
analogous to receiving or sending requests and replies (a read when the request or
reply is received, and a write when the request or reply is sent). Additionally, their
processes may be analogous to our activities, but in general the security policies are
not compatible nor they can be encoded in our model even with analogous notions.
Bertino et al. [5] treat exception-based information flow controls in object-
oriented systems. They extend close work from Jajodia, Kogan, Sandhu [17] and
Samarati et al. [23] to include operations (exceptions) normally not allowed by
the strict security policy. They use an ACL (discretionary control) to operate on
write and create actions, and with the permissive exceptions, they relax the strict
policy imposed on those same actions. The use of exceptions to alter the strict
applications mandatory rules of [5] is similar to the use of discretionary conditions
in our framework. Both mechanisms allow one to bypass the rigorous application
of strict/mandatory access controls.
Attali, Caromel and Contes present high-level rules which define a security pol-
icy for GRID applications built upon ProActive [2]. It is based on a discretionary
approach where entities follow a hierarchical structure and relies on a Public Key
Infrastructure. By comparison, our work focuses only on the communication ac-
tions, studies confidentiality in information flows specific to service-oriented appli-
cations, and uses both discretionary and mandatory approaches.
On the practical (implementation) side, Java-like languages that include infor-
mation flow controls (as in [ 3,20]) could be complemented with our model. They
control information flows inside a program, so they could be enhanced to control
all communication interactions with other local and non-local programs, in either
distributed or cooperative systems.
Comparing to previous work, Definitions 1 and 2 put together a combination of
independent mandatory and discretionary controls, but the discretionary condition
is evaluated only when the transmission involves a data downgrading case. This
does not represent a standard way of policy enforcement because we also have the
ability to verify the security level of a new activity (i.e. a whole entity which en-
capsulates data), and of a single transmitted data (i.e. data sent in requests). More-
over, definition 4 is implicitly based on the Bell-LaPadula model, where security at
run-time takes into account a state machine with an initial secure state, and whose
transitions from state to state are secure if the access rules are not violated.
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5 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
We have presented a precise security model for the secure information flow in ASP.
The solution is mainly founded on three cornerstones: the concept of flow of infor-
mation, security levels attached to activities, and the definition of security rules to
be applied to all communications.
The security policy (involving assignation, use, and definition of security lev-
els) also takes into account the way information is handled in our model. When
confidentiality is involved, there may exist high-level activities which may need
to communicate with low-level activities (normally denied by the mandatory ac-
cess rules of "no write down"). So by also tagging data with a security level we
gain flexibility as the mandatory rules are not broken, and still, with the help of
additional discretionary rules, we guarantee that this kind of actions are explic-
itly allowed. Communications are then controlled according to specific security
rules. These rules are predefined in the case of mandatory rules, where the secu-
rity levels of processes and data are always compared and applied; and in the case
of discretionary rules, they are externally defined (for example in a file describing
permissions for the whole system). By allowing discretionary exceptions to the
mandatory rules, we obtain a highly expressive system. Consequently, the result-
ing properties are rather weak as we do not take advantage of the MAC aspect of
our model; however, stronger properties could be guaranteed by imposing some
consistency requirements to the DAC rules.
Finally, we have demonstrated the specificity of our security mechanism: its
application to service-oriented computing with replies by the means of futures, and
the specific issues that are arisen by our communication mechanism.
A prototype of this security model has been implemented in the ProActive mid-
dleware [21] for distributed and mobile (Grid) computing, and is currently under
evaluation on real-size examples for scalability and flexibility. In the future, it is
planned to study more specifically moblility aspects and to use a role-based access
control (RBAC) approach in order to extend and improve the discretionary access
to activities.
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A An Example
A.1 Context
We focus an a financial application specifically oriented to the stock market. The
global scenario has the following actors: a stock exchange market, a few banks,
and some clients. In this scenario, the main idea is to transform some source infor-
mation in order to produce another type of information latter used as support in a
trade decision process (e.i. decisions to make with respect to the buying and selling
of actions in the stock market). In this sense, the stock exchange market will act
as the provider of the raw or source information, transferring it to its direct clients,
which in this case are the banks.
By unfolding the general bank process (Figure A.1), we notice that it is com-
posed of other subprocesses. Figure A.2 exposes with the BPMN notation the
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Bank A
Bank B
Bank C
Bank Z
Client 2
Client n
trade
study
results
Client 1
information
raw
Stock
market
exchange
trade
orders
trade
orders
Fig. A.1. Generalized business schema for a financial application.
composition of a bank process. A reception process takes the information coming
from the stock exchange, and according to some filtering and redistribution rules,
it sends the possible narrowed information to its specified targets. The targets may
be external business partners or they can be internal.
Communication
manager
External
entities
bank’s
own
branches
investment
groups
Stock
experts
stock
market
statistic
analysis
historic
forecast
analysis
receive
analysis
results
study and
approve
results
emit final
judgement
Automated
analysis
stock
broker
information
dispatcher
trade
orders
dispatcher
broadcaster
other clients
(individuals)
trade
decisions
Fig. A.2. A bank’s private business processes.
Following the bank’s internal or private workflow, after reception of the infor-
mation by the stockbroker process, the provided information is passed to a statis-
tic analysis, then confronted with historic forecasts, the result studied by market
experts, producing buying and selling orders, which are finally sent to the stock
exchange through the same initial stockbroker process. Finally, there is a new re-
distribution of information executed by the trade orders dispatcher. In this new
information distribution, the whole or part of the analysis results can be offered
and sold to other kind of clients, meanwhile the stockbroker places the trade orders
to the stock market. Moreover, the stockbroker process has two important activi-
ties, one is the reception of information, and the other is the reply to this reception
with the trade orders.
A.2 An Implementation in Secured ProActive
The internal processes presented in the previous section are grouped into general
processes corresponding to ProActive activities named E (experts), A (analysis), C1
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and C2 (Communications), S (stock), I (investment), B (branch), and Clnt (client).
Figure A.3 shows the information flows translated into a ProActive communi-
cation schema (based on REQUESTS –Rq– and REPLIES –Rp).
Rq4 Rp4Rq2
Rp4’Rq4’Rp3Rq3
Clnt
Rq7
I B
Rq5 Rp5 Rq6 Rp6
E
A
Rq1
S
C1
Rp4’’
C2
Rp4’’’
Rq4’’
Fig. A.3. ProActive model for the banking process, with request and reply transmissions.
In the case of Rq1, S provides information to C1 in a "push" manner (through a
repetitive transmissions of requests), a constant feeding of information can be done,
and in consequence, there is no need of replies from C1 to S.
Emission of information from C1 to A is achieved with Rq2. Exchange of
information between A and E is done with the pair Rq3-Rp3.
The communication between C2 and C1 requires a series of transmissions. C1
will require the results from C2 and will have to communicate through A and E.
Then, with Rq4, C1 asks the results to A; with Rq4’, A demands the results to E; in
turn, with Rq4”, E communicates with C2; and finally, the response will return to
C1 trough the corresponding replies.
Information from C1 to I and B is provided on demand, hence the respective
pairs Rq5-Rp5 and Rq6-Rp6. Rq7 between C2 and Clnt follows the same method-
ology as Rq1. Finally, transactions of trade orders between C1 and S are accom-
plished with Rq8-Rp8.
From Figure A.3, the assignation of security levels is to be done, and depending
on these affectations, entries for matrix M have to be added.
For the bank’s internal processes, let us define a relation of security levels with
λE = λA > λC1 > λC2 meaning that, process E gets the highest security level
because it represents the financial expert’s work; process A also gets a high level
because it saves the results coming from E for the historic analysis; and process C1
gets the next highest level after A mostly because it has to manipulate the results
or trade decisions. With respect to the security levels for the bank’s external pro-
cesses, we suppose: λS > λC1 (the stock market requires to have a high level of
protection), λI > λC1 (the investment group requires also a high level), λB = λC1
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(considering the bank’s branches are "internal" processes), and λC2 > λClnt (the
bank has a higher level of security than the clients).
Once the security levels are assigned to processes, REQUESTS are analyzed
in order to determine what are the levels to be assigned to data transmitted, corre-
sponding entries are also required for the discretionary access.
Request Level of data Entry for M(α, β) Reason for reply
Rq1 λin= λC1 RqS→C1(d, λC1) —
Rq2 λin = λC1 — —
Rq3 λin = λA — λE = λA
Rq4 λin = λC1 — r = fut(f ′′E→C24 ) or r = fut(f
′A→E
4
)
Rp′′′
4
authorized by λC2 < λC1
Rq4′ λin = λA — r = fut(f ′′E→C24 )
Rq4′′ λin = λC2 RqE→C2(d, λC2) λC2 < λE
Rq5 — — λC1 = λI
Rq6 — — λC1 = λB
Rq7 λin = λClnt RqC2→Clnt(d, λClnt) —
Table A.1
Summary of security levels assigned to the bank’s processes
Table A.1 gives the complete overview of security levels given to data, the re-
quired entries for matrix M, and the values returned in the responses. From this
table, in the case of request Rq1, by assigning to the transmitted data the same
security level of the target (λC1), it is needed an entry or explicit rule, allowing
communications from S to C1.
For request Rq2 there is no needed entry for the matrix, and also there is no
reply.
In the case of request Rq3, there is no needed entry, and the corresponding reply
will be the value of r (i.e. whatever value process E will return as result for this
request). It is also shown the condition that allows the reply, which for Rq3 is
because λE = λA.
For the combined case of the "fourth" request, replies to Rq4, Rq4′ , and Rq4′′
will contain the reference to a future (corresponding to the value to be produced
by C2). Consequently the value of reply to C1 must be obtained directly from C2
by another reply Rp4′′′, and hence allowed to be transmitted because λC2 < λC1.
Other replies must only contain informations stating aliasing between futures (e.g.
the value of future f ′A→E
4
is the future f ′′E→C2
4
). Note that aother possible replies
go from E to C1, from C2 to A, but a reply containing the result from A to C1 is
forbidden, thus C1 must first receive aliasing informations stating that the future
fC1→A
4
is the future f ′′E→C2
4
before receiving Rp4′′′.
For requests Rq5, and Rq6, there is no data transmitted in the request but they
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both receive a reply value.
Rq7 is similar to Rq1.
This example shows the specificity of our security model. Considering secure
path for information flow from C1 to C2, formally written Secϕ A.E(C1, C2), the
flow of information transits through high-level processes (i.e. processes A and E).
Classically, these high-level process would block any subsequent communication
because of the "no write down" property (e.g. request Rq4′′ is sending (or writing)
data from a high to a low level process, and in consequence, it would be blocked).
Nevertheless, the security model allows a safe communication from end-to-end (in
this case between C1 and C2).
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